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Abstract
With the signing of the EU–UK trade and cooperation agreement in December 2020, the configurations of Brexit have
started to become clearer. The first consequences of the UK’s decision to leave the EU have become visible, both in the
UK and in the EU. This thematic issue focuses on a relatively under-researched aspect of Brexit—what the UK withdrawal
has meant and means for the EU. Using new empirical data and covering most (if not all) of the post-2016 referendum
period, it provides a first overall assessment of the impact of Brexit on the main EU institutions, institutional rules and
actors. The articles in the issue reveal that EU institutions and actors changed patterns of behaviour and norms well before
the formal exit of the UK in January 2020. They have adopted ‘counter-measures’ to cope with the challenges of the UK
withdrawal—be it new organizational practices in the Parliament, different network dynamics in the Council of the EU or
the strengthening of the Franco-German partnership. In this sense, the Union has—so far—shown significant resilience in
the wake of Brexit.
Keywords
Brexit; Council of the EU; Court of Justice; European Parliament; institutional change; interest groups; negotiations;
Norway; United Kingdom
Issue
This editorial is part of the issue “What Brexit Means for Europe: EU Institutions and Actors after the British Referendum,”
edited by Edoardo Bressanelli (Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies, Italy) and Nicola Chelotti (Loughborough University
London, UK).
© 2021 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
With the deal between the European Union (EU) and
the United Kingdom (UK) sealed on Christmas eve 2020,
four and a half years after the British referendum, Brexit
was completed.We finally know ‘what Brexitmeans’ and,
although the implementation of the agreement will take
time, the separation has been effective and neat, with
theUK leaving the singlemarket, andwith an end to both
freedom of movement and the jurisdiction of the Court
of Justice of the EU (CJEU) over British laws.
The conclusion of the Brexit negotiations and the
end of the transition period also provide the opportu-
nity to assess what impact Brexit has had on the EU
institutions and actors so far. As Tim Oliver once put
it (2016), there has been relatively little focus on what
‘Brexit means for the EU.’ Research on Brexit abounds
and has, instead, largely focused on issues such as its
causes (e.g., Hobolt, 2016), its impact on British politics
(e.g., Ford & Goodwin, 2017) and the EU–UK negotia-
tions (e.g., Martill & Staiger, 2020).
Oliver’s assessment remains largely true today, even
if it can certainly be better qualified. Scholars have
started to reflect on the future of EU integration with-
out the UK using macro-theoretical approaches such
as ‘disintegration’ or ‘differentiated integration’ (e.g.,
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Schimmelfennig, 2018). In addition, several studies have
focused on specific EU policy areas or discrete poli-
cies. Most notably, a thematic issue of Politics and
Governance has endeavoured to assess ‘EU policies after
Brexit’ (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019). Other book-length
treatments of the impact of Brexit have normally includ-
ed a section on Britain and another on the EU—with the
latter focusing on both macro-models and sectoral poli-
cies (e.g., Diamond, Nedergaard, & Rosamond, 2018).
This thematic issue aims to fill this gap in the litera-
ture on Brexit by asking what has changed for EU insti-
tutions and actors after the 2016 British referendum.
It considers institutions broadly, including both ‘institu-
tional rules’ and what may otherwise be called ‘organisa-
tions.’ It provides the first extensive treatment of the top-
ic focusing on themain EU institutions (i.e., the European
Council, the Council of the EU, the European Parliament,
the CJEU), key institutional rules (i.e., agenda-setting, the
ordinary legislative procedure) and relevant actors (i.e.,
interest groups). In so doing, the contributors to this the-
matic issue address not only specific questions about
Brexit, but also on EU integration more generally.
Our vantage point hugely benefits from the fact that
the Brexit period is finally concluded and Brexit is, as a
consequence, less of a ‘moving target’ than it used to be
when some early analyses of the EU institutional set-up
were made (cf. Jensen & Snaith, 2018, p. 255; see also
Jacobs, 2018; Patel & Reh, 2016). A first overall assess-
ment, based on new empirical data and covering most
(if not all) of the post-referendum period can, therefore,
be attempted. To be sure, this remains, in many respects,
still preliminary, and a more all-round impact assess-
ment would require additional data, time, and research.
Finally, the thematic issue evaluates the real impact
of Brexit rather than simply taking the UK out of the
‘decision-making equation’ (for a similar approach, see
also De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2019). This allows most
contributors to be less speculative in their conclusions
and, the sophistication of counterfactuals notwithstand-
ing (Huhe, Naurin, & Thomson, 2020), to ground the
Brexit impact on observable behaviour rather than past
history and theoretical simulations.
2. Before Brexit: Anticipatory Adaptation and Informal
Change
The thematic issue endeavours to observe change in
norms and patterns of behaviour already as a result of
the outcome of the British referendum of 23 June 2016,
rather than just as a consequence of the formal with-
drawal of the UK on 31 January 2020. The referendum
set in motion a number of informal changes, which pre-
dated the formal exit of the UK from the EU three and a
half years later.
The long preparation to Brexit has allowed the EU
institutions to prepare the UK withdrawal and antici-
pate some of its likely consequences. As the EU did
in not too dissimilar circumstances in the past—for
instance, preparing to its ‘mega’ enlargement to Central
and Eastern Europe (cf. Best, Christiansen, & Settembri,
2008)—the Union and its institutions proved capable of
foreseeing changes in their environment. ‘Anticipatory
adaptation’ could be observed, for instance, in revis-
ing the order of the country taking up the rotating
Presidency of the Council of the EU, which should have
been assigned to the UK in the second half of 2017.
Contributions in the thematic issue highlight several
instances when, following the 2016 referendum, EU insti-
tutions started to adopt ‘counter-measures’ to deal with
the challenges of the UK withdrawal. The drivers of insti-
tutional adaptation are different—and would certainly
deserve further theoretical exploration—but EU institu-
tions and actors may seek to protect themselves from
the ‘malign’ influence of a soon-to-be third country; they
may fear the organizational consequences of withdraw-
al and seek minimizing potential disruptions; they may
be guided by the willingness to ‘punish’ disintegration
and prevent further exits. Whatever the reason, the EU
has been able to prepare for the departure of a large
member state, making the impact of its actual departure
less onerous.
Johansson (2021)—by analysing networks in the
Council of the EU—finds that the UK was less central
in 2018 (after) compared to 2015 (before the referen-
dum). Even if the UK only stopped attending the Council
meetings in September 2019, behavioural dynamics and
coalition patterns in the Council had already changed
when the UK was still an active member state, much
to the detriment of the UK itself. Focusing on the
European Parliament, Bressanelli, Chelotti, and Lehmann
(2021) track a declining influence of the UK delegation
since 2017, although British Members (MEPs) remained
in Parliament until January 2020. As they argue, large
cross-party alliances are often formed in the European
Parliamentwhen the institution is ‘under attack’ or when
its members seek to expand its powers: Such a grand
coalition was, during the Brexit negotiations, meant to
limit the role of the British MEPs.
Simoncini and Martinico (2021) present an
interesting—if legally very contentious—case. This is the
decision to dismiss the British Advocate General Eleanor
Sharpston from her job, notwithstanding the fact that,
according to a legal interpretation, this decision would
violate EU law and put at risk the independence of the
CJEU. The member states decided to terminate her man-
date early—in theory, she should have served in the role
until October 2021—and such a decision was implement-
ed by the CJEU. In so doing, they treated the Advocate
General as if she effectively represented the UK and
dismissed her because “Brexit ought to mean Brexit”
(Pech, 2020).
Finally, Coen and Katsaitis (2021) show that the UK
business groups played a rather minor role in the meet-
ings with the EU Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier, who
actively engaged with stakeholders. As the prospect of
UKmembership in the single market waned and because
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of their diminished role in pan-European organisations,
they targetedmainly the British government. Conversely,
Barnier himself directed his attention to British public
interest groups, which served to maintain the EU’s legit-
imacy vis-à-vis a portion of the UK’s public as well as EU
nationals in the UK.
3. After the UK Withdrawal: Leadership and
Decision-Making
If the British referendum already set in pace Brexit-
related changes, the UK formal withdrawal from the EU
in early 2020 unleashed new, or reinforced pre-existing
institutional dynamics. As Krotz and Schramm (2021)
argue, Franco-German leadership became stronger with
Brexit. This was due not only to the rules for qualified
majority in the Council—with the new weights for the
double majority, of states and population, favouring the
medium and large member states—but mainly to the
necessity of Franco-German leadership to overcome the
existential crises of the EU, Brexit included.
A specific instance of the ‘new’ Franco-German lead-
ership is provided in the field of financial services.
Van Kerckhoven (2021) shows that France and Germany
are seeking to shape a different agenda—in essence, a
more stringent rule-based approach towards the finan-
cial industry—and gain a more prominent role in this
sector post-Brexit. One of the earliest direct impacts of
Brexit—i.e., the relocation of the EU agencies based in
London to ‘the continent’—rewarded Paris as the new
site of the European Banking Authority, signposting the
French assertiveness and willingness to create an EU-27
financial hub.
While rules and agenda-setting powers in financial
services are arguably set to change, Copeland (2021)
emphasises continuity over change in the field of social
policy. Despite the extension of the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure, the decision-making mode in the field
remains intergovernmental, with (some) member states
pulling the brake to more radical developments. Even
if the UK was not supportive of supranational develop-
ments, it was certainly not the only member state to
share this attitude, making intergovernmentalism very
likely to ‘survive’ post-Brexit.
4. The Resilience of the Union
Brexit was part of an impressive string of crises hitting
the EU since 2010. As with other crises, the prospects
for Europe were dire: Brexit was widely regarded as a
threat to integration and a trigger for disintegration, with
a domino effect boosting Eurosceptic parties and fuelling
the demands for other ‘exits.’ This scenario has notmate-
rialized; if Brexit (and other crises) have demonstrated
anything, this is the strong resilience of the Union.
Looking beyond the EU and its institutions, Brexit
also acted—so far at least—as a deterrent rather than
as a stimulus for change for non-member countries with
close relationships to the EU. Fossum and Vigrestad
(2021) look at Norway, a member of the European
Economic Area. If the Norwegian option was soon ruled
out as a model for the future EU–UK relationship, was
Brexit instead a source of inspiration for Norwegians?
Their analysis reveals that Norway re-assessed the costs
and benefits of its relationship with the EU in the light of
Brexit, but both parties and public opinion maintained
their preference for the status quo, with the former
keen to depoliticize the issue of European Economic
Area membership.
The capacity of the Union to ‘absorb’ environmen-
tal shocks and adapt to challenging conditions should be
duly acknowledged. As this thematic issue has shown,
while it is still possible to argue that the impact of Brexit
on the EU institutions and actors “should not be overstat-
ed” (Puetter, 2017, p. 249), this is so not just because
the EU ‘muddles through’ from crisis to crisis, but also
because its institutions and actors can be proactive, seek-
ing to prevent major disruptions in their operations.
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